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S/25442
19 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1993 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 19 March 1993.

(Signed) Terence O'BRIEN
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning
the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish]

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines, 1/ for facilitating full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 approved by Security Council resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991.

2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The present report is the seventh report submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines. The preceding reports were submitted on 13 September 1991, 2/ 10 December 1991, 3/ 12 March 1992, 4/ 11 June 1992, 5/ 8 September 1992, 6/ and 4 December 1992. 7/

3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review no information as requested by paragraph 12 of the guidelines has been received by the Committee.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations ought to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, i.e., items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period under review, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to provide the Committee with any relevant information that may come to their attention. During the period under review, no information as requested by paragraph 14 of the guidelines has been received by the Committee.

6. In a note dated 25 January 1993, 8/ the President of the Security Council published the text of the statement made to the media on behalf of the members

of the Council. He had stated that the members of the Council had held informal consultations on 25 January 1993 pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations, the President of the Council had concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for a modification of the regime established in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), as referred to in paragraph 21 of that resolution.

7. Since the submission of the previous report of the Committee on 4 December 1993, 9/ no allegations of violations, particularly in connection with paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), have been reported to the Committee.

8. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991, 10/ no further replies have been received from member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

Notes

1/ S/22660, annex.

2/ S/23036.

3/ S/23279.

4/ S/23708.

5/ S/24083.

6/ S/24545.

7/ S/24912.

8/ S/25157.

9/ S/24912.

10/ S/22884/Add.2.

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Security Council

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S/25443
19 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 MARCH 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina established pursuant to Security Council resolution 781 (1992).

On 21 February 1993, in a meeting with the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the senior Bosnian Serb aviation officer in Banja Luka, Major-General Ninkovic, requested permission for military jet aircraft to fly at one of the airports in Banja Luka. UNPROFOR's Chief Military Observer, at that meeting, clearly pointed out that such flights would constitute violations of Security Council resolutions 781 and 786 (1992), and, therefore, could not be authorized.

On 11 March 1993, the UNPROFOR airfield monitors at the Mahovljani airfield in Banja Luka were requested to authorize technical flights for three military jet aircraft. On instruction from the Monitoring Command and Control Centre of UNPROFOR in Zagreb, the airfield monitors advised the local Serb authorities that the flights could not be approved. The local authorities responded that the flights would proceed regardless.

The same day, between 11.50 a.m. and 13.07 p.m., the airfield monitors witnessed the take-off and landing of the three military aircraft. The aircraft were also tracked by AWACS radar. The airfield monitors inspected the aircraft and did not find any evidence of armaments or ordnance.

I feel obliged to report this incident separately to the Council since the Bosnian Serbs chose to disregard the provisions of Security Council resolutions 781 and 786 (1992) although they had been advised twice that the flights concerned would constitute violations. UNPROFOR has strongly protested the incident to the Bosnian Serb authorities and demanded that these and other violations cease immediately.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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S/25444
19 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina established pursuant to Security Council resolution 781 (1992).

On 13 March 1993, at 16.15 p.m. local time, military personnel of the United Nations Protection Force in the area of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina observed one bi-plane followed by two mono-planes dropping bombs on the villages of Gladovici and Osatica, approximately five miles south-east of Srebrenica. All three planes were single engine propeller-driven aircraft.

The bi-plane dropped three bombs on Gladovici and then flew in the direction of the Drina river which delimitates the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Immediately thereafter, a single engine propeller mono-plane circled over the same village and, after dropping three bombs, left in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The second monoplane circled Osatica and also dropped three bombs. It also departed in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In all three cases the origin of the aircraft could not be ascertained.

The above flights are the first violations of Security Council resolution 781 (1992) observed by UNPROFOR which involved combat activity.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

93-16233 (E) 190393

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UNITED
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Security Council

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S/25445
23 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the attached communication which was conveyed to me by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex I

Letter dated 18 March 1993 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the resolution adopted by the Agency Board of Governors today on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency.

Attached also is my report to the Board on the matter.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure I

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD ON 25 FEBRUARY 1993 (GOV/2636) AND OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (INFCIRC/403)

Resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March 1993

The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling its Resolution of 25 February in which the Board called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to give the IAEA access to additional information and to two additional sites with a view to implementing the Safeguards Agreement of May 1992 (INFCIRC/403),

(b) Regretting the absence, so far, of a positive response by the DPRK,

(c) Noting the recent announcement of the DPRK regarding its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the implications for the Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the DPRK if such withdrawal were to take effect,

(d) Concerned, in particular, that this announcement comes at a time when the IAEA is seeking specific clarifications regarding the correctness and completeness of the initial report on nuclear material submitted by the DPRK,

1. Approves the efforts of the Secretariat to implement the Board's Resolution as reported in GOV/INF/681;

2. Reaffirms its full confidence in the Director General and the Secretariat, and its support for the actions they have taken to implement the Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK in an impartial and an objective manner;

/...

3. Confirms that INFCIRC/403 remains in force and that it is essential and urgent that the DPRK enable the Agency to take the necessary measures to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with that Safeguards Agreement;

4. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts and dialogue, taking all the appropriate contacts, and to report further on the response of the DPRK to the Resolution of 25 February at a meeting of the Board to be held on 31 March 1993.

Enclosure II

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD ON 25 FEBRUARY 1993 (GOV/2636) AND OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (INFCIRC/403)

1. On 25 February 1993, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2636) which, inter alia, called upon the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea urgently to extend full cooperation to the IAEA to enable the Agency fully to discharge its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the DPRK and the Agency (INFCIRC/403) and to respond positively and without delay to the Director General's request of 9 February 1993 for access to additional information and two additional sites. The Board of Governors decided that access to the additional information and sites was essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403. The Director General was requested to continue dialogue with the DPRK with a view toward urgent resolution of the issues, and to report again to the Board of Governors on the matter not later than one month from the date of adoption of the resolution at a further meeting of the Board of Governors to be convened for this purpose.

2. On 26 February, the Director General forwarded the text of the resolution to the DPRK, requesting the co-operation of the DPRK in the implementation of the resolution (Annex II). In particular, the Director General asked hat the DPRK receive an inspection mission that would leave Vienna on 13 March and arrive in Pyongyang on 16 March. The purpose of the mission was to seek additional information required by the Agency and to secure access to the two additional sites referred to in the resolution adopted by the Board.

3. On 10 March, the DPRK informed the Director General that the Government of the DPRK reserved its consideration of the receipt of the inspection team, referring to the resumption of the joint military exercise "Team Spirit" by the United States and the Republic of Korea and the "state of semi war" ordered by the Supreme Commander of the DPRK from 9 March (Annex III).

4. On the same day, the Director General replied to this communication, advising the DPRK that the "state of semi war" could not impede the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement (Annex IV). He further requested the DPRK to consider positively the receipt of the inspection team at the earliest possible date.

5. The Agency received a copy of a 12 March statement by the Government of the DPRK declaring its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a measure to defend its supreme interests (Annex V). In its statement, the DPRK indicated that this stand would remain unchanged "until the United States stops its nuclear threats against the DPRK and the IAEA Secretariat returns to its principle of independence and impartiality."

6. On 12 March, the Director General wrote to the DPRK taking note of the DPRK's statement and advising the DPRK that the Safeguards Agreement remained in force until any withdrawal took effect (Annex VI). He further noted that a declaration of intention to withdraw from the NPT shall not impede the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement.

7. On 16 March, the DPRK replied to the Director General's communication of 12 March. In its reply, it was stated that because - inter alia - "some officials of the IAEA Secretariat departed from the objectivity and impartiality and joined in a plot of a party in hostilities towards us which is trying to strangle our socialist system", the DPRK "cannot receive the Agency inspection teams" (Annex VII).

8. The Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK provides, in Article 26, that the Agreement shall remain in force as long as the DPRK is a party to the NPT. Pursuant to Article X.1 of the NPT, a State party to the Treaty has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. Notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council is required three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. It is clear that the Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK remains in force for three months after notification under Article 26.

Annex II

Communication dated 26 February 1993 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

As you are aware, the Board of Governors met on 22, 23 and 25 February to consider its agenda item, "Report on the implementation of the Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". At the end of its deliberations, the Board adopted the attached resolution without a vote.

Operative paragraph 4 reads as follows:

"Calls upon the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea urgently to extend full co-operation to the International Atomic Energy Agency to enable the Agency fully to discharge its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement and to respond positively and without delay to the Director General's request of February 9, 1993 for access to additional information and two additional sites".

In operative paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Board:

"Decides that access to additional information and two additional sites, referred to in paragraph 4, is essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403".

Operative paragraph 6 of the resolution:

"Requests the Director General to transmit this Resolution to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to continue dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view toward urgent resolution of the issues above, and to report again to the Board of Governors on the matter not later than one month from the date of adoption of this resolution at a further meeting of the Board of Governors to be convened for this purpose".

I am addressing this telex to you to seek your co-operation in the implementation of that resolution. In particular, I ask you to receive an inspection mission that would leave Vienna on 13 March and arrive in Pyongyang on 16 March. Its principal focus will be to seek additional information required by the Agency as part of its efforts to clarify inconsistencies noted between the DPRK's declarations and the Agency's findings. The information now being sought was discussed in Vienna on 20 and 21 February between a DPRK delegation led by Minister Choi and an Agency delegation led by me. The specifics are contained in a letter of 25 February from Mr. Schuricht, Director of Division of Operations A, Department of Safeguards to Mr. Choi Jong Sun, Director of External Relations, Ministry of Atomic Energy. In order to help prepare for the mission, it would be helpful if, to the extent possible, the requested information could be provided by facsimile to the Agency in advance.

The inspection mission will also be authorized to visit the two sites identified in my telex of 9 February to Minister Choi, namely:

(a) the site which Agency officials visited on 14 September 1992 and which is located east of the Radiochemical Laboratory

(b) the site described in my letter of 15 January to Minister Choi.

I would appreciate an early response to this cable. I very much hope that continuing dialogue between the Agency and the DPRK authorities and full co-operation by the DPRK will lead to full and prompt implementation of the Safeguards Agreement as called for by the Agency's Board of Governors.

Hans BLIX

Annex III

Communication dated 10 March 1993 from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea addressed to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

It is to acknowledge the receipt of your telex dated 26 February.

I have several times mentioned our view, position and the solution regarding clarification of "inconsistencies" and access of two additional sites requested by you. Nevertheless some officials in the IAEA secretariat involved in the superpower's strategy against Korea presented the problems which could have been solved without any difficulties through the ad hoc inspections exaggeratedly in difference with reality to the February Board meeting, and thereby the Board adopted the unjust resolution. It is very regretful for us.

Now the United States and south Korean authorities reopened the joint military exercise "Team Spirit" which was ceased and they are conducting the nuclear war exercise mobilizing the large-scale armed forces against us.

In this context our country has been put in the state of semi-war by the order of the Supreme Commander on 8 March 1993, from 9 March.

I have to inform you under such political and military circumstances created in our country that we could not but reserve consideration of the receipt of the inspection team concerning the implementation of the unjust resolution of the February Board meeting.

CHOI Hak Gun
Minister, Ministry of Atomic Energy

Annex IV

Communication dated 10 March 1993 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

I thank you for your telex of 10 March 1993 replying to my telex of 26 February.

I understand your telex to mean that, as your country has been "put in the state of semi-war", you are not in a position to consider receiving an IAEA inspection team. I am bound to note that this cannot impede the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement.

In its resolution of 26 February, the Board decided that access to additional information and to the two locations referred to in my telex to you of 9 February "is essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification compliance".

In view of the above, I ask you to consider positively the receipt of the IAEA inspection team at the earliest possible date. As you are aware, I am to report again on the matter to the Board not later than one month from the date of the adoption of the resolution.

Hans BLIX
IAEA, Vienna

Annex V*

Statement of DPRK Government

A grave situation has been created today in our country, which threatens its national sovereignty and the security of our State.

The United States and the South Korean Authorities have defiantly resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war rehearsal against the DPRK, and, in coincidence with this, some officials of the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and certain member nations following the lead of the United States had a "resolution" adopted at the 25 February meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, demanding a special inspection of our military sites unrelated to nuclear activities.

This is an encroachment on the sovereignty of the DPRK, an interference in its internal affairs and a hostile act aimed at stifling our socialism. The DPRK Government sharply condemns the reckless nuclear war machinations of the United States and the South Korean Authorities against the Korean people and decisively rejects the unjust resolution of the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

Proceeding from its anti-nuclear, peace policy, the DPRK Government joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has since fulfilled its obligations under the NPT in good faith. It was on the premise that the depository States of the NPT should neither deploy their nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula nor pose any nuclear threat against the DPRK that the DPRK Government signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and accepted the IAEA inspections.

Nevertheless, the United States remains unchanged in continuing its nuclear war threats against the DPRK, far from fulfilling its obligations under the NPT as a nuclear-weapon State to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea and remove its nuclear war threats against the DPRK. The United States still maintains its nuclear weapons in South Korea and continues to reinforce its nuclear storages there with modernized nuclear weapons and equipment.

This serves to prove that the "statements" such as the so-called announcement on the "complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons" by the United States and the "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" by the South Korean Authorities were all nothing but a trickery to deceive our people and the world peoples.

Although an agreement on non-aggression was reached between the North and the South and the DPRK has been faithfully fulfilling its international obligations under the NPT and the safeguards agreement, the proposed inspection of the United States nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in South Korea remains yet to be carried out and our people's misgivings about the United States nuclear threats have not yet been dispelled.

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* Previously reproduced in S/25407, annex.

Despite the strong opposition by our people and the world peoples, the United States resumed when the inspection of our country by the IAEA was going on the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, which it had suspended before the IAEA inspections of the DPRK started, thus openly increasing its nuclear threats.

The "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvres run downright counter to the idea and purposes of the NPT which calls for respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty and stop to nuclear threat. The resumption of the "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvres, a nuclear war rehearsal targeted against the DPRK, is driving the situation on the Korean peninsula to such an unpredictable extreme, which has compelled our country to enter a semi-war state.

Still more grave is the fact that the IAEA passed a resolution aimed at forcing a "special inspection" of our military installations, thus joining the United States in its anti-DPRK machinations to "internationalize" the so-called "nuclear problem" of the DPRK and to impose "collective sanctions" and "pressure" on it.

It is on the basis of the "intelligence information "fabricated by the United States, a belligerent party vis-à-vis the DPRK, that some officials of the IAEA secretariat are trying to enforce the inspection of our major military installations which are unrelated to nuclear activities.

As for an inspection of the military installations in question, it has nothing to do at all with the inspections under the safeguards agreement. And it is a matter outside the competency of the IAEA.

If we submissively accept an unjust inspection by the IAEA, it would legitimize the espionage acts by the United States, a belligerent party vis-à-vis the DPRK, and set the beginning of the full exposure of all our military installations. Under our specific conditions in which the country still remains divided and exposed to the constant nuclear threats from the United States, it will be totally inconceivable to lay our military sites open to the enemies.

It is an old method of the United States to satisfy its demands one by one, that is, to demand the opening of one military site today and another tomorrow.

If we refuse to accept the "special inspection" of our military sites, the United States plans to charge the DPRK with "non-implementation of the special inspection" and take the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations so as to impose "collective sanctions" on the DPRK. This is the very scenario which the United States has written in advance.

If we failed to hold in check such conspiracy of the United States and its followers, our entire nation would be driven into confrontation and war and be made a victim of the big Powers.

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat have broken away from their original standpoint of supervising the implementation of the NPT on the basis

of impartiality and strict neutrality. Therefore they can never evade the responsibility for joining the United States in its anti-DPRK manoeuvres.

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat insist so stubbornly on the "inspection" of our military bases, as dictated by the United States, while ignoring our demand for an inspection of the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases of the United States in South Korea. This is obviously an act biased in favour of the United States. A belligerent party vis-á-vis the DPRK.

Moreover, we can hardly repress our indignation at the application of dual criteria by the IAEA, which is putting pressure to bear upon the DPRK on charges of the alleged "nuclear weapons development", while tacitly approving the moves of Japan and South Korea for their nuclear armament.

The accession to the NPT by the DPRK Government was intended to remove the nuclear threats of the United States against the DPRK, never to sacrifice its sovereignty and security for someone's benefit. Because of the imprudent machinations on the part of the United States and its adherent forces, each time we undergo an inspection of the IAEA the nuclear threats against the DPRK increase, and the peace and security on the Korean peninsula is not ensured but disturbed.

All these facts evidently show that the United States, those forces hostile to the DPRK and some officials of the IAEA secretariat are misapplying the NPT to jeopardize the sovereignty and security of our country, a non-nuclear-weapon State, and stifle our socialist system.

Under such abnormal situation prevailing at present, we are no longer able to fulfil our obligations under the NPT.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea declares its decision to withdraw unavoidably from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a measure to defend its supreme interests.

The withdrawal from the NPT is a well-justified self-defensive measure against the nuclear war manoeuvres of the United States and the unjust act of some officials of the IAEA secretariat against the DPRK. The DPRK's principled stand will remain unchanged until the United States stops its nuclear threats against the DPRK and the IAEA secretariat returns to its principle of independence and impartiality.

The United States must give up its outdated way of thinking of the cold war era and immediately stop the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war rehearsal, and refrain from manipulating the IAEA to discredit and strangle the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Even if the United States, the forces hostile to the DPRK and some officials of the IAEA secretariat threaten us with the "special inspection" or a certain "measure", we will never be frightened in the least. No robber-like argument and strong-arm acts will go down with us. Whatever "military threat", "political and ideological offensive" or "blockade" cannot block the march of our people.

The DPRK Government's policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purpose remains unchanged and our people will continue to make every effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear weapon-free zone.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our thanks to many IAEA member States and a number of the members of the IAEA Board of Governors cherishing international justice for their support and sympathy for the just stand of the DPRK.

Our rejection of the unjust "resolution" forced by the United States upon the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is meant to defend our country's sovereignty and at the same time to safeguard the common interests of the developing countries.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people are convinced that the Governments and peoples of the countries of the world that value peace and justice will pay a profound attention to the serious situation on the Korean peninsula and extend their support and solidarity to the self-defensive measure of the DPRK Government.

Annex VI

Communication dated 12 March 1993 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The Agency has received, from the DPRK Permanent Mission in Vienna, a copy of your Government's statement of 12 March declaring its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

I expect to report very soon to the Board of Governors of the IAEA on the implications for the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and the DPRK of such a grave step. The justification for a withdrawal will certainly be seriously considered by the Parties to the Treaty. For the IAEA, which is responsible for the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, under the Agreement concluded pursuant to Article III of the NPT, I am bound to point out that the Treaty and the Safeguards Agreement remain duly in force until any withdrawal takes effect, i.e. after three months advance notice to all other Parties and to the United Nations Security Council.

It follows that a declaration of intention to withdraw from the NPT shall not impede the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement. My request contained in my telex of 10 March that you "consider positively the receipt of the IAEA Inspection Team at the earliest possible date" therefore still stands.

I can assure you that the Agency will continue as always to implement the Safeguards Agreement with objectivity and impartiality. The sole objective is to seek clarity about the nuclear activities in the DPRK subject to safeguards.

Hans BLIX

/...

Annex VII

Communication dated 16 March 1993 from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea addressed to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

I acknowledge the receipt of your telex of 12 March. It was agreed at our several meetings that the problems raised in the implementation of the safeguards agreement should be solved through consultations, and at that time, you recognized that any mistake could be made in Agency inspection and said that Agency would review it again since "principal inconsistencies" are not the matter unable to be clarified.

Nevertheless, before doing reviews and consultations you submitted "inconsistencies" which do not exist to some Member States without agreement with us and thus internationalized the matter of the implementation of our safeguards agreement, neglecting our sincere efforts for clarification of the "inconsistencies".

Moreover the nuclear threat by the U.S. against our country is being increased and "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war manoeuvre which was suspended are resumed and in conclusion with this, you submitted to the February Board meeting the report which is quite different from the real situation using the "intelligence information" fabricated by a third party and thus enabled the Board of Governors to adopt the unjust resolution of "special inspection" concerning our military sites not relevant to nuclear activity. This is a clear evidence showing that you joined in the plot of hostile country, a party in hostilities towards us which is trying to make our military sites open, to disarm us and thereby to strangle our socialist system.

/...

The Government of the DPRK declared solemnly to withdraw from NPT on 12 March, because the increased nuclear threat by the U.S. against our country and unjust resolution adopted at the February Board meeting jeopardized the sovereignty of our nation and the supreme interests of our country. One of the major reasons for withdrawal from NPT is that some officials of the IAEA Secretariat departed from the objectivity and impartiality and joined in a plot of a party in hostilities towards us which is trying to strangle our socialist system.

In such circumstances, I make it clear that we cannot receive the Agency inspection teams.

I think you can never extricate yourself from the responsibility for all consequences resulting from this.

I ask you to circulate to the Governor's Member States this letter including my letters to you dated 14 and 27 January, 15 February and 10 March.

CHOI Hak Gun

Minister of Atomic Energy, DPRK

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19 March 1993

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LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, once again, Iraq failed to participate in the meeting of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Border Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC) which took place in Geneva, during the period from 15-18 March 1993. This is the fourth consecutive time in which Iraq refuses to attend UNIKBDC's meetings, which currently pertain to the demarcation of the sea boundary.

Kuwait strongly regrets Iraq's continued non-participation in UNIKBDC's work, which clearly portrays Iraq's ill-intention towards complying with Security Council resolutions.

The Security Council, on the basis of its responsibility for peace and security in the world, must therefore take appropriate measures to ensure Iraq's compliance with the letter and substance of its relevant resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25447
22 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to submit, enclosed herewith, a letter dated 19 March 1993, by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, addressed to you.

I would be grateful if you would provide for the distribution of this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 19 March 1993 from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General

My country highly regards your indefatigable and devoted efforts to bring peace to the territory of the Republic of Croatia and the area of former Yugoslavia. The United Nations has the pivotal role in the ongoing initiatives for creating stability and security in the region. With sincere appreciation for all the actions you are currently undertaking, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate some of the highlights of Croatia's proposal for the facilitation and improvement of the future performance of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

Croatia welcomes the fact that the United Nations is seriously considering our call for a more effective and resolute UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Croatia. We firmly believe that the execution of the new UNPROFOR mandate should clearly conform with the political solution that is to be defined under the auspices of the Security Council. This solution should secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, including the imposition of the authority of the Croatian Government over the entire territory of the Republic, as well as providing maximum respect for human and minority rights in Croatia.

We advocate defining the obligations of the Croatian Government and Serbian local authorities must fulfil during each stage of the peace process, thus ensuring the complete implementation of the Vance plan. It is our firm opinion that the peace operation taking place on Croatian soil should be redefined in order to utilize concrete mechanisms for the active implementation of the Vance plan, including the time-frame for its gradual execution. Only through the effective implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions will we be able to reach a just and everlasting solution to the ongoing crisis within the shortest possible period.

At this moment the UNPROFOR operation is taking place on the territory of two sovereign Member States of the United Nations - Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina - and on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, "Yugoslavia" has no competence either in a legal or a political sense for the ongoing UNPROFOR action. This is not a civil war but an international armed conflict caused by Serbian aggression against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the essence of the crisis. Therefore, the definition of the character of the peace mandate and the formal agreement on the status of United Nations forces must be reached among the respective Governments and the United Nations. Consequently, the agreement on the future mandate and status of UNPROFOR in Croatia must be concluded between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

Croatia would like to see the UNPROFOR mandate prolonged for an additional six months, based upon the premise of the dynamic concept of gradual implementation of the Vance plan and relying on the political solution that would mutually respect Croatia's sovereignty as well as the rights of minorities

on its territory with the goal of creating lasting internal and regional stability and security.

In Croatia, the UNPROFOR operation must have an approach parallel in spirit and execution to the action the world community is prepared to undertake in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The success of the implementation of the peace plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina is closely linked to the positive outcome of the peace action in Croatia. Therefore, Croatia is calling for the same level of determination in achieving a peaceful solution based upon the key Security Council resolutions and peace plans formulated under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Failure of the peace efforts in Croatia will decrease hopes of reversing Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ending unbearable civilian suffering and material destruction. We remain determined that the future UNPROFOR operation in Croatia should be based on the following fundamental principles: (a) immediate beginning of the process of restoring Croatian civil authority in the so-called "pink zones"; (b) the complete and immediate demilitarization of the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs) and the establishment of local police forces in accordance with the general principles of the Vance plan; (c) full implementation of Security Council resolution 769 (1992) which imposes firm control by UNPROFOR forces of the border areas in Croatia where the boundaries of the UNPAs coincide with internationally recognized frontiers of the Republic of Croatia; without the effective control of these borders the aggression by Serbian forces will continue in the future; (d) voluntary and unconditional return of all the refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

Croatia believes that one of the first steps in the reintegration process that is to be a part of the new UNPROFOR mandate should be the promotion of confidence-building measures aimed at decreasing distrust and tensions among the people in the area. It is important to normalize life and living conditions in all the territory of Croatia as soon as possible. Therefore, one of the primary tasks for UNPROFOR should be the reopening of major roads, railways, aqueducts, electric transmission lines and pipelines throughout the UNPAs. It is essential to establish immediately the normal traffic of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway. In the process of reopening the roads, priority must be given to the highway Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Županja, as well as to the roads Karlovac-Plitvice-Obrovac-Šibenik; Plitvice-Gračac-Knin-Split; Vinkovci-Ilok; Vinkovci-Vukovar and Osijek-Bilje-Beli Manastir-Kneževo.

The United Nations operation in the Republic of Croatia should also provide continuous humanitarian assistance to the population in the occupied areas and to the population in the parts of Croatia which have been isolated and blocked due to the hostilities, especially in the southern coastal region of Dalmatia. The Croatian Government is preparing various measures for normalizing living conditions throughout the UNPAs, which will be undertaken after the vigorous implementation which is desired from UNPROFOR. We are ready to take all measures for re-establishing and integrating the school system, social and health care, and pension system with the rest of the Republic of Croatia. We will issue Croatian identification cards to all its citizens in the UNPAs, as well as passports and other documents, in accordance with the existing procedure.

Reopening of the high-voltage transmission grid through Sector South is of vital importance for the million inhabitants in Dalmatia and is also for the benefit of the Serbian population in Sector South. The Adriatic oil pipeline which partly crosses through Sector West should also be immediately reopened because of its strategic value for the Republic of Croatia, as well as to the neighbouring countries of Central Europe.

The Croatian Government is prepared to proceed with direct talks on normalization, confidence-building and minority rights issues with the legitimate representatives of the Serbian population from each of the UNPA sectors, namely those who have been elected in local elections before the outbreak of the conflict. We firmly believe that one of the important steps in the renewed and revised mandate of UNPROFOR should be organizing internationally supervised local elections in these parts of Croatia, taking into account the 1991 census; this will produce legitimate representatives of the Serbian and other local population on all the governmental levels. We would welcome the participation of these elected representatives in the work of both chambers of Croatian Parliament.

Croatia cannot be satisfied with the results of the ongoing UNPROFOR operation, nor with the manner in which it was performed. Although we salute the brave effort of the UNPROFOR personnel and their devotion to peace, we must unfortunately express dissatisfaction with the fact that the most important provisions of the Vance plan have not yet been fulfilled. We think that this is primarily due to the limited character of the existing UNPROFOR mandate, which proved to be inadequate to initiate and support the process of the return of the refugees, control of international borders of Croatia, disarming of Serbian paramilitary units and restoration of Croatian government authority in the "pink zones" and UNPAs.

Security Council resolution 807 (1993), which provides the UNPROFOR forces in Croatia with additional measures for their own protection, is a good starting-point for intensifying the implementation of the Vance plan, given the fact that the Security Council authorization to UNPROFOR to use force when necessary is essential not only for the personal safety of United Nations troops, but also for the fulfilment of all unaccomplished provisions of the Vance plan.

Although Croatia is committed to full cooperation with the UNPROFOR, we cannot accept the extension of the same mandate that has been badly misused by the Serbian side. Negotiations and confidence building are absolutely essential, but this process cannot be initiated, nor carried out, without a strengthened UNPROFOR mandate and international guarantees for securing the results of the peace process in the region.

(Signed) Franjo TUDJMAN
President of the
Republic of Croatia

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S/25448
22 March 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraqi airspace by United States aircraft for purposes of reconnaissance and provocation and in order to drop heat flares on certain areas continued during the period 9 to 16 March 1993, as follows:

9 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,500 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 34 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Jalibah, Samawah, Salman, Qal'at Salih, Ushbayjah and Busayyah.

At 1000 hours on 9 March 1993, hostile United States aircraft dropped 30 heat flares on the area near Nasiriyah in the southern region.

10 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 30 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 40 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 3,500 to 11,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Amarah, Qurnah, Khidr and Busayyah.

11 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 27 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,500 to 7,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Dohuk and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 24 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 metres, centred

over Qurhan, Nasiriyah, Busayyah, Khidr, Halibah, Artawi, Samawah, Lataf, Ushbayjah and Qal'at Salih.

At 1357 hours on 11 March 1993, a TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 18,000 metres penetrated Iraqi airspace in the northern region. It left at 1445 hours.

12 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 18 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 7,500 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 46 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Amadiyah, Salman, Jalibah, Basra, Ushbayjah and Busayyah.

At 1025 hours on 12 March 1993, a hostile formation broke the sound barrier at an altitude of 7,000 metres over Mosul.

13 March 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile activity was recorded in the northern region on this day.

(b) Southern region: 57 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Amarah, Lasaf and Busayyah.

At 1315 hours on 13 March 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at 600 kilometres per hour and flying at an altitude of 20,000 metres penetrated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left at 1400 hours.

14 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 26 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,500 metres, centred over Ayn Zalah, Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 40 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Busayyah, Artawi, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah and Qal'at Salih.

At 1400 hours on 14 March 1993, a hostile two-aircraft formation broke the sound barrier at an altitude of 7,000 metres over the Nasiriyah area.

15 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 32 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,500 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 34 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Shatrah, Artawi and Busayyah.

16 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 32 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Tall Afar, Zakho, Dukan and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 39 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Ushbayjah, Jalibah and Busayyah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/25449
23 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, a letter dated 19 March 1993 by His Excellency Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to you.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 19 March 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Republic of Croatia and the Muslim forces of Alija Izetbegovic continue to interfere with the efforts of the United Nations to resolve the problems, through negotiations and in a peaceful manner, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in particular to end the bloody war in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina and create the conditions for the extension of the mandate of the United Nations peace-keeping forces in the United Nations protected areas. They particularly seek to engage the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the war and thus provoke foreign military intervention. To achieve those ends, the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been constantly threatened and its sovereignty violated by naked aggression over a long period of time, especially when important negotiations were under way or crucial agreements to be reached. The Security Council has been duly informed in the past few months about it with a request that such aggressive conduct and the escalation of the conflict be prevented.

However, the Republic of Croatia and the Muslim leadership of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to pursue their aggressive policies. Throughout March, the Bosnian Muslims attempted several times to infiltrate terrorist groups in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Those have been identified and prevented at the right time. In the nights between 3 and 4 and 10 and 11 March, powerful terrorist groups clandestinely crossed the Drina River but were intercepted just in time before they could proceed with their bloody intentions. Furthermore, on 12 March around 4.15 p.m., the Muslim forces shelled downtown Banja Koviljaca in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to extensive structural damage to civilian targets, one person was killed and another wounded. As you are aware, a team of United Nations military observers is currently in Banja Koviljaca coordinating the humanitarian effort to deliver relief to the Muslims in eastern Bosnia.

As you have been already informed, the Republic of Croatia also persists with armed provocations on the border with the Republic of Montenegro in addition to more open violations of the Prevlaka peninsula status, the territory under United Nations protection. In his letter of 24 February, my predecessor informed the Security Council of the armed provocations of 19 and 20 February 1993 in this area, which resulted in loss of life. Similar provocations occurred on 7, 8 and 11 March when the Army of Croatia, from their positions in the area of villages Dubravka and Pelinovo Brdo, attacked with artillery and tank fire the units of the Army of Yugoslavia located in the area of Sitnica village. There was no response to those provocations and the United Nations military observers were duly informed.

Mr. President, I note with regret that so far effective measures by the Security Council have failed to materialize with a view to putting an end to the aggression of the Muslims and the Republic of Croatia against the territory of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro respectively. Moreover, the Security Council has completely ignored those problems.

We, therefore, follow such developments with deep concern. In the interest of peace, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has continued to make the greatest sacrifice and desisted from adequately responding to armed provocations. That, however, cannot go on interminably. Consequently, I once again appeal to the Security Council to seriously consider those problems and undertake appropriate measures to prevent further armed conflicts.

I should be grateful if you would inform the members of the Security Council of the contents of this letter and have it circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Federal Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia

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S/25450
22 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 MARCH 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the alleged violations of Security Council resolution 781 (1992).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the alleged violations of Security Council resolution 781 (1992)

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expresses its concern over the alleged combat use of aircraft in eastern Bosnia on 13 March 1993 and the violation of Security Council resolution 781 (1992). It is surprising that the statement adopted by the Security Council on that occasion demands from the Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide immediate explanation of the aforementioned violations of resolution 781 (1992) - thus being a priori taken as a perpetrator - and that the Secretary-General has been requested to "ensure that an investigation is made of the reported possible use of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ... to launch air attacks against the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

Therefore, in the interest of truth, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia finds it necessary to point out the following facts:

It is well known that the highest officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia proposed that military observers be deployed at the airfields in its territory. Sensitive and unusual as this measure might be, it was advanced to dispel false and unscrupulous accusations of the alleged use of the Yugoslav Air Force in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As confirmed by United Nations documents, none of 465 violations of the no-fly zone were made by the aircraft of the Yugoslav Air Force. The one-sided accusation that Yugoslavia has violated the no-fly zone and thus undermined the peace process is astonishing at a time when agreements are in sight to end the war and find a peaceful and just solution to the problems in former Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which Yugoslavia is vitally interested.

Due to such a one-sided approach in evaluating this event, the Muslim and Croatian side had been forthwith freed of any responsibility. At the same, time, the fact that the Muslim side has on a number of occasions orchestrated horrendous crimes targeting civilians in the territory under its control, particularly in Sarajevo, and blamed the Serbs, has been completely ignored. That has invariably been the case when important agreements to end the war were to be reached. The description of aircraft and the targets, close to the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, indicate that we are dealing with a provocation and a premeditated fraud whose purpose is to exert pressure, in this moment, on the Security Council.

Airplanes and helicopters of the Air Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia have not violated the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the no-fly zone came into effect, not even for humanitarian flights to evacuate the sick and wounded members of the Army of the Serbian Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina, especially after Croatia's aggression against the territory under United Nations protection.

On the day of alleged combat use of aircraft in eastern Bosnia, the airplanes of the Air Force did not violate the airspace of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. That has been unambiguously confirmed by the United Nations observers deployed at airfields in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We have no reason to believe that they have indicated otherwise in the official reports or that those have been tampered with.

Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence of the Army of Yugoslavia did not register the violation of the airspace of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the said time by the aircraft that allegedly left in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Likewise, no aircraft activities have been registered in the airspace of eastern Bosnia at the time and place quoted in the United Nations documents.

On this occasion as well, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reaffirms its readiness strictly to abide by the provisions of Security Council resolution 781 (1992), as has been the case so far, and desist from any act that may impede the search of a just solution and establishment of a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the territory of the former Yugoslavia as a whole. To that end, we stand ready to undertake further measures with a view to establishing the truth and thoroughly investigating this particular incident.

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S/25451
22 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that I have decided to appoint Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia and a former Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, as my Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). The appointment, which is at the rank of Under-Secretary-General, will become effective on 1 April.

I would be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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S/25452
22 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 18 March 1993 (S/25451) concerning the appointment of Mr. August Ramirez Ocampo as your Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They welcome your decision.

(Signed) Terence Christopher O'BRIEN
President of the Security Council

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S/25453
22 March 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 20 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, on 13 March 1993, six Iranian military aircraft raided a hospital in the Raniyah district of northern Iraq, killing and injuring a number of civilian in-patients at the hospital and causing extensive material damage to the hospital building.

Iraq has previously warned the Iranian side of the consequences of continuing its hostile and provocative acts and of the violation by its aircraft of Iraq's national airspace. It would like to refer in this connection to document S/24745, which contains a letter from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq concerning the violation of Iraqi airspace by an Iranian aircraft on 24 October 1992.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq vehemently protests against this hostile act, and it holds Iran fully responsible for engaging in such acts as are incompatible with the rules of international law and with the Charter of the United Nations and calls upon it to refrain therefrom in future.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/25454
22 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to submit, enclosed herewith, a letter dated 19 March 1993, by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, addressed to you.

I would be grateful if you would provide for the distribution of this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 19 March 1993 from the Prime Minister of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On 30 September 1992 President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tudjman and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Mr. Dobrica Ćosić signed a joint declaration in Geneva on the basis of which the Yugoslav Army withdrew from Prevlaka, the southernmost part of Croatia, on 20 September 1992, in compliance with the Vance Plan. For reasons of security the Prevlaka area has been demilitarized at both sides of the state border between Croatia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia); the situation there is supervised by the United Nations observers.

The Republic of Croatia strictly abides by the agreed arrangements. There are no Croatian armed forced in the Prevlaka area and the law and order there is kept by a limited number of police forces.

As reported by the Croatian Ministry of Interior, the Prevlaka area is peaceful without any incidents. Reports by the United Nations observers deployed there can also be used as evidence of it.

Nevertheless - as reported by the Tanjug Yugoslav news agency - Mr. Pavle Bulatović, Defence Minister of the FR Yugoslavia, declared that in the days to come he would introduce a "series of political and military measures" for the "protection of the territorial integrity of FR Yugoslavia" due to more months of alleged artillery attacks in the Prevlaka area. A few days before this statement Dr. Radoje Kontić, Prime Minister of FR Yugoslavia, in his letter to the Security Council requesting a prolongation of UNPROFOR's mandate, referred to "continuous armed provocations by and build-up of Croatian armed forces in the border strip between Montenegro and Croatia". A representative of the Yugoslav Army, Counter-Admiral Dušan Rakić, as reported by the Montenegrin Radio, declared to the MPs in the Montenegrin town of Herceg Novi, close to Prevlaka, that "a new war with Croatia was only one step away".

Therefore, through the invention of such threats from Croatia an atmosphere is being created and preparations made for a renewed aggression at the southern part of Croatia.

The fact that Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia) is in no way threatened by Croatia was recently confirmed by the Montenegrin Minister of Interior Mr. Nikola Pejaković, who said in the Montenegrin Parliament that the "situation in Prevlaka was stable" and that "the stories about the military build-up towards Montenegro were invented". After this statement the militant MPs of the Serbian Radical Party - the leaders of which had already committed many war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina - walked out, requested that the Minister of Interior be held responsible for his words and threatened Croatia with "thousands of their volunteers".

The above mentioned statements and actions taken by the political and military leadership of FR Yugoslavia, actually of Serbia - because the military command is concentrated in the Headquarters and Supreme Council in Belgrade -

pose a serious threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia as well as to the international peace and security in this part of Europe where it is already the third year in succession that an aggressive war of Serbia has been going on against two United Nations Member States, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Let me remind you, Your Excellency, that the aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and the Yugoslav Army in autumn 1991 was undertaken against the said southern part of Croatia under a similar pretext that the Croatian forces had attacked the strategically important and exceptionally well fortified Prevlaka radar-rocket base of the Yugoslav Army, although at that time the Republic of Croatia, which had freshly declared its independence and sovereignty, had virtually no armed forces of its own.

The Croatian Government wants to bring to the notice of Your Excellency as well as the United Nations Security Council that FR Yugoslavia is systematically and seriously threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia - specifically, by announcing a military occupation of the Prevlaka area in the south of Croatia - through outspoken statements given by top Yugoslav political and military officials. In this connection the Croatian Government wants to remind Your Excellency and the Security Council of your commitments in such situations resulting from the United Nations Charter.

You are kindly requested, Your Excellency, to notify the United Nations Member States on the contents of this letter.

(Signed) Hrvoje ŠARINIĆ
Prime Minister

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S/25455
22 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF VIET NAM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the letters dated 16 March 1993 from H.E. Mr. Nguyen Manh Cam, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam addressed to H.R.H. Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, and to H.E. Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Head of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

I would be very grateful if you could have these letters circulated as documents of the Security Council.

(Signed) TRINH XUAN LANG
Permanent Representative

Annex I

Letter dated 16 March 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam addressed to the President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia

Following a series of massacres of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia, which took place after the signing of the Paris agreement on the political settlement of the Cambodia problem, the recent 10 March 1993 barbarous massacre of Vietnamese residents committed by the Democratic Kampuchea faction is a source of extreme emotion and concern for the Government and people of Viet Nam. Viet Nam's stance on this matter was clearly expressed in the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam on 11 March 1993.

It is most heartening to us that Your Highness has expressly shared Viet Nam's deep concern and on many occasions spoken out in defence of the Vietnamese community in Cambodia as you would for other foreign resident communities.

In face of the risk of the Khmer Rouge's escalation of crimes against the lives and properties of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia, we urgently request the Cambodian parties, the Supreme National Council, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia and the international community to take determined measures to stop the killing of Vietnamese residents and protect their peaceful life and legitimate interests in exact conformity with the spirit of the Paris agreements and other international instruments on human rights.

It is our sincere wish that Your Highness, in your capacity as President of the Supreme National Council and with your high prestige and vast influence, will instruct the SNC to take strong, urgent and effective measures to protect the Vietnamese residents in Cambodia, thus showing your good will and evincing the spirit of the joint statement which I had the honour to sign with Your Highness in January 1992.

(Signed) NGUYEN MANH CAM
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Annex II

Letter dated 16 March 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam addressed to the Head of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

The Government and people of Viet Nam are deeply concerned about the increasingly grave acts of terrorism and massacre committed by the Khmer Rouge faction against Vietnamese residents in Cambodia, since the signing of the Paris agreement, of which the recent brutal massacre of 33 Vietnamese residents at Chong Kneas fishing village in Siem Reap Province in the evening of 10 March 1993 is the latest evidence.

We highly appreciate the positive and timely measures you have taken to investigate into this incident, leading to the 16 March conclusion that the Khmer Rouge faction was the culprit.

In face of the risk of the Khmer Rouge's escalation of crimes, the Government of Viet Nam urgently appeals to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, within its authority and mandate provided for by the Paris agreement, to undertake its full responsibility and take strong, urgent and effective measures with a view to putting an end to brutal massacres of Vietnamese residents, protecting their peaceful life and legitimate interests in exact conformity with the spirit of the Paris agreement as well as other international instruments on human rights.

(Signed) NGUYEN MANH CAM
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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GENERAL

S/25456
22 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Prime Minister of France telephoned me very early this morning to convey his deep concern over the situation developing in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UNPROFOR commander, who is in Kiseljak to oversee personally the relief operation to Srebrenica has been reporting continuing obstruction by regular and irregular Serb forces of relief efforts.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also had reported that UNHCR's relief efforts were blocked despite intensive and persistent negotiations with the political and military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and the highest levels of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including personal assurances from Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic.

The High Commissioner further reports that thousands of people are seeking refuge in Srebrenica from surrounding areas which are being systematically attacked and occupied by Serb forces, and that 30 or 40 persons are dying daily from military action, starvation, exposure to cold or lack of medical treatment.

The only positive feature in this appalling situation is a report from the UNPROFOR Force Commander a short while ago that last night six United States aircraft dropped 32 tons of food and 1 1/2 tons of medical supplies in the area, and that tomorrow air-drops by another nine aircraft are planned. He also has just reported that at about mid-day New York time the land convoy was able to enter Srebrenica.

Despite these positive developments, it is becoming starkly evident that a massive humanitarian tragedy may be unfolding in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a result of defiance by Serb elements of the resolutions of the Security Council. I shall be grateful if you would bring these considerations to the attention of the members of the Council. I shall, of course, keep you informed of further developments.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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22 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the consideration by the Security Council of a draft resolution on the proposed enforcement by Member States of the interdiction on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/25440).

In this connection, I received, during the weekend, a cable from the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Lt-Gen. Lars-Eric Wahlgren, expressing his grave concern about the proposed resolution. In brief, his view is that the activity that has so far occurred from the air has had no significant impact on the military situation. His apprehension is that the proposed enforcement action will have negative consequences for the viability of UNPROFOR within its existing mandate. In particular, he is concerned that the delivery of humanitarian aid, the protection of which constitutes the predominant part of UNPROFOR's work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, would be seriously jeopardized. The Force Commander is also deeply worried about the safety and security of the most vulnerable elements of UNPROFOR, viz., military observers and civilian personnel in locations in the region where they would become vulnerable, notably, the air fields.

I feel it my duty to bring the concerns of the Force Commander to your immediate attention. Members of the Council would recall that Gen. Wahlgren's predecessor, Gen. Nambiar, had expressed similar apprehensions.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda items 30, 35, 73 and 74
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES
IN THE NEAR EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER
ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 22 March 1993 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am instructed by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which retains the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of Palestine, to bring the following to your attention.

In the past several months, the level of repressive measures and lethal actions by the Israeli authorities against the Palestinian people living in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, has increased dramatically. This reflects what appears to be a new policy adopted by the Government of Israel. Several public statements made by high-level Israeli officials have also clearly incited further violence against Palestinians. Today three Palestinian youths were killed by the Israeli army, including Mohamed Tawfik Jarbouh, a Palestinian child 11 years of age from the Rafah refugee camp, who was killed when he was hit in the neck by a bullet. Further, four Palestinians were killed over this past weekend. In the Gaza Strip alone, since 1 December 1992, 52 Palestinians, including 17 children under 16 years of age, have been killed by Israeli troops or settlers, some cases of which have been tantamount to intentional killing. The effects of the presence and actions of the Israeli colonial settlers, who have been brought to the occupied Palestinian territory by the Israeli authorities in blatant violation of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, 1/ which is

applicable to all the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, are alarming as the pattern of killing and injuring Palestinian civilians by armed settlers continues to rise.

During the same time period, since 1 December 1992, approximately 2,000 Palestinian civilians have been wounded and injured. This figure includes over 400 children who have been shot by live ammunition. These numbers are disturbing, for the total of fatalities for the past four months has been higher than that recorded during the first four months of the intifadah in the occupied Palestinian territory.

Such Israeli policies and practices drastically undermine the efforts aimed at achieving peace in the Middle East. This represents yet another Israeli obstacle, in addition to the obstacle of the unresolved deportee crisis due to Israel's non-compliance with Security Council resolution 799 (1992) of 18 December 1992, to the resumption of negotiations in the current peace process.

The above-mentioned developments lead us to reiterate our belief in the necessity for the Security Council to carry out its responsibilities and provide, in accordance with resolution 681 (1990) of 20 December 1990, international protection for the Palestinian people living under Israeli occupation. In this regard, we recall your report of 25 January 1993 (S/25149). We, as the representative of the Palestinian people, request that the Security Council formally consider this situation, with the aim of adopting concrete measures to provide protection for the Palestinian people in the framework of Security Council resolution 681 (1990).

I would be grateful if you could arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 30, 35, 73 and 74, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Nasser AL-KIDWA
Permanent Observer of Palestine
to the United Nations

Notes

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.